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ABSTRACT
Multiple nations within the Wabanaki Confederacy, including the Maliseet
Nation, Mi’kmaq Nation, Passamaquoddy Tribe, and Penobscot Nation, were
signatories to the July 19, 1776 Treaty of Watertown, which was the first ever treaty
entered into by the United States of America following the Declaration of
Independence. Following the Treaty of Watertown, Wabanaki warriors served
directly under General George Washington and made critical contributions in
support of the Americans’ Revolutionary War. Such contributions were made based
on the Americans’ promise that the Wabanaki Nations’ lands, natural resources, and
traditional ways of life would be forever protected by the fledgling United States.
Unfortunately for the Wabanaki Nations, their Revolutionary War-era promises were
largely disregarded as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and then the State of
Maine systematically oppressed their indigenous inhabitants by ignoring an
emerging body of federal law, based on the Doctrine of Discovery, which was
intended to protect those very indigenous people. This Article delves into this
complex history by exploring the Doctrine of Discovery, historical dealings between
the Wabanaki and the Americans, and the events and court cases leading up to the
enactment of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act (MICSA), which resolved
Wabanaki land claims against the State of Maine for the illegal taking of tribal lands.
This Article then analyzes the legislative history and text of the MICSA and
juxtaposes this record with federal common law interpreting the rights of federally
recognized Tribal nations. Finally, this Article argues that federal common law
interpreting the rights of Tribal nations should be relied upon when interpreting the
scope of specific Wabanaki rights that were never ceded or relinquished in treaties
or in the MICSA.
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INTRODUCTION
The Wabanaki Confederacy, including the Abenaki (Aponahki), Maliseet
(Wolastoqay), Micmac
(Mi’kmaq),
Penobscot
(Panawahpskek),
and
Passamaquoddy (Peskotomuhkati), played a critical role in support of the Americans
during the Revolutionary War. Representatives of some of the Wabanaki Nations
signed the Treaty of Watertown,1 which was the United States’ first diplomatic act
as a self-declared sovereign nation, just days after the Declaration of Independence
on July 19, 1776.2 In it, the Wabanaki Nations committed vital resources, including
military support, to the fledgling nation-state at a time when the war for
independence against Great Britain was going poorly for the Americans.3
The Wabanaki Chiefs answered the Americans’ call to arms at the urging of
General George Washington.4 The Chiefs led their warriors to victory in battle with
the British and sent warriors to serve directly under General Washington himself. In
return, the Wabanaki Nations expected to be involved in treaty-making with the
newly founded democracy so the United States would forever protect Wabanaki
people, lands, and resources, as promised in the Treaty of Watertown.5 The Treaty
of Watertown’s promises of mutual defense, friendship, and assistance rung hollow
in the years following the Revolutionary War, as the Wabanaki people were
displaced from the vast majority of their traditional territories by the time Maine
entered the Union in 1820. 6 Nonetheless, the Wabanaki’s critical contributions to
the creation of the new American democracy and the forging of the northern border
between the United States and Great Britain7 could not be overlooked; thus, treaties
to protect certain lands and resources were executed with them.8 The People of the
State of Maine then ratified a constitution that dutifully engrained these treaties into
Maine’s organic law upon the grand bargain, known as the Missouri Compromise,
which facilitated the United States’ continued economic dependency on human
enslavement.

1. See Treaty of Watertown, Mass.-St. John’s & Mickmac Tribes, July 19, 1776, https://www.maine
history.org/PDF/Redact/Treaty_of_Watertown_1776.pdf [https://perma.cc/W574-HKCK] (last visited
May 13, 2022) [hereinafter Treaty of Watertown].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Letter from George Washington to the St. Johns Tribe (Dec. 24, 1776), in FREDERIC KIDDER
& GEORGE HAYWARD ALLEN, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MAINE AND NOVA SCOTIA DURING
THE REVOLUTION 58-59 (Frederic Kidder eds., 1867) [hereinafter Letter from GW to St. Johns Tribe];
From George Washington to the Chiefs of the Passamaquoddy Indians, 24 December 1776, FOUNDERS
ONLINE NAT’L ARCHIVE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-07-02-0340 [https://
perma.cc/5MVT-2RH2] (last visited May 13 2022) [hereinafter Letter from GW to Passamaquoddy
Tribe].
5. See Passamaquoddy Indian Papers: Collection No. 9014, in CORNELL UNIV. LIBR., 1775-1912
[hereinafter Passamaquoddy Indian Papers].
6. See MICAH PAWLING, WABANAKI HOMELAND AND THE NEW STATE OF MAINE: THE 1820
JOURNAL AND PLANS OF SURVEY OF JOSEPH TREAT 277, 278 (2007); see also Treaty Between the
Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Sept. 29, 1794, https://www.
passamaquoddy.com/?page_id=1422 [https://perma.cc/YW44-V7GA] (last visited May 13, 2022).
7. See Passamaquoddy Indian Papers, supra note 5.
8. PAWLING, supra note 6, at 278.
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This Article examines the vitality of the inherent indigenous rights reserved
within, and connected to, the treaty agreements enshrined in the Maine Constitution.
In doing so, this Article will explore the applicability of federal Indian common law
doctrines to the federally recognized Wabanaki Nations located in what is now
Maine. In particular, Section I of this Article summarizes the primary tenets of the
body of law known as “federal Indian law,” including the Doctrine of Discovery and
the Marshall Trilogy. Section II explores certain aspects of Wabanaki-American
diplomatic, legal, and military interactions from the American Revolution through
the 19th Century. Section III examines the period leading up to, and including, the
Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980 (MICSA). Section IV analyzes cases
that illustrate the divergent ways that federal and state courts applied doctrines of
federal Indian common law in controversies involving the Wabanaki Nations in the
years after MICSA. Finally, this Article concludes by arguing that federal Indian
common law doctrines are applicable to an analysis of reserved, and never
extinguished, Passamaquoddy rights.
I. ROOTS OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Federal Indian law is the complex result of over two hundred years of federal
law, including treaties, statutes, and court decisions, collectively known as common
law. Many of these decisions rely on overtly and covertly racist themes that date
back to the Roman Empire.
A. Evolution of the Law of Nations (a.k.a. the Doctrine of Discovery)
The inherently discriminatory nature of federal Indian law can be traced to the
Roman Empire and Europe’s Middle Ages. The Roman Empire stretched across
much of Europe and Asia and developed jus gentium, or the Law of Nations
(commonly called the “Doctrine of Discovery”), to govern foreigners and provincial
subjects in far-flung lands.9 The Roman Empire’s adoption of the Roman Catholic
Church placed the Pope above the Roman Emperor in all Christian and secular affairs
and gave Papal decrees the force of law within the Roman policy of the Roman
Catholic Church.10 Although different European nation-states applied the Law of
Nations in slightly distinct manners, application of this concept in the Roman Empire
represented a link between conquered peoples, title to their land, and the sovereign
power of the Emperor.11 The Pope’s position above the Emperor reinforced the
Christian themes of unity and hierarchy that created a basis for all Papal policy
concerning the non-Christian indigenous inhabitants of the Americas.12
The themes of unity and hierarchy that were originally rooted in the Bible
created a foundation for the Church’s influence over European nation-states and the
foreign policy that was made applicable in the New World. In the Book of John,

9. Robert Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 252-53 (1986).
10. Robert Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian
in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-17 (1983).
11. Id.
12. See id. at 13-14.
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Jesus told Peter, “[f]eed my sheep.”13 Generations of Christian scholars interpreted
Jesus’ message to impose a duty on Peter and the Pope, God’s chosen vicar, to look
after all human beings.14 This mandate created a hierarchical structure from God to
Jesus, to the Pope, and to all human beings.15 It also instituted an order of unity that
required all men to follow the word of the Pope above all else.16 In the 5th Century,
European nation-states began to apply this original mandate from Jesus to Peter to
ensure the sanctity of the Christian hierarchy in newly conquered lands.17 Finally,
this mandate to justify the conversion of non-Christians was used by St. Augustine
in the 6th Century to carry out a “just war” to enforce internal discipline within
Christendom and the Crusades, which sought to reinforce and extend the influence
of the Church’s hierarchy and unity.18
In 1199, Pope Innocent III wrote Quod super his to rationalize the Crusades
against non-Christians and to outline the rights of such infidels and heathens.19
Innocent postulated in Quod super his that infidels possessed the natural law right to
acquire property and govern themselves, but that the Pope retained the right to
intervene in the affairs of such peoples if they rejected the Church’s message of
hierarchy and unity.20 He reasoned that Christ empowered the Pope, as a caretaker
of such non-Christians, who “belong to Christ’s flock by virtue of their creation,”
and concluded that the Pope “had jurisdiction over all men and power over them in
law.”21 Innocent’s reasoning rationalized the subjection of non-Christians to
inhumane treatment, violent means of conversion, and impaired rights, all to help
achieve a vision of Christendom.22 Quod super his incorporated the Christian ideals
of hierarchy and unity into a framework of rights held by all men. This framework
was the basis of European colonial policy in the New World.
B. Establishment of a Spanish-Christian Hierarchy in the New World
The dynastic aspirations of the Spanish Crown in the 15th Century and
“discovery” of the New World created a fertile basis for the employment of the
principles of Quod super his. In 1493, Pope Alexander VI gave Spain title to a large
portion of the New World with the expectation that Spain would extend the reach of
the Christian-based kingdom into the Americas.23 King Ferdinand of Spain then
promulgated Christian-inspired rules to govern the New World in a proclamation
entitled Requerimiento.24 Requerimiento formally established Spain’s title to the
New World from Pope Alexander VI and instituted a hierarchy that required the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
1977)).
22.
23.
24.

John 21:17.
Williams, supra note 10, at 23-24.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 30-32 (1990).
Id. at 44.
WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 13-14.
Id. at 44 (quoting THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE 191-92 (James Muldoon ed.,
Id.
Williams, supra note 10, at 46.
WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 91-92.
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indigenous inhabitants of the Americas to recognize the Catholic Church as superior
to all men, the Pope as the Church’s high priest, and the King and Queen as sovereign
rulers of the Americas.25 The Requerimiento also stated that a failure to recognize
the Christian hierarchy would entitle Spain to force the obedience of America’s
indigenous inhabitants to the Church and would forfeit indigenous rights to selfgovernance.26 Only forty years after Europeans landed in the Americas, King
Ferdinand’s proclamation was challenged by Franciscus de Victoria’s 1532 essay
“On the Indians Lately Discovered.”27
Victoria’s essay was the first to apply natural law to the discourse on the
inhabitants of the Americas and made the natural law assumption that all men have
certain inherent rights as free and rational people.28 The essay was broken up into
three arguments. Victoria first argued that natural law gave all men the right to
possess property and that the extinguishment of indigenous title to property only
occurred if they lacked “reason.”29 Second, Victoria argued that the Pope did not
have the authority to give Spain title to lands occupied by the discovered Indians
because they were assumed to be free and rational people under natural law
principles.30 This point refuted the previously accepted Doctrine of Title by First
Discovery.31 In his third point, Victoria postulated that the violation of the
universally binding Law of Nations by indigenous inhabitants could justify a nation’s
conquest in the Americas and the impairment of indigenous rights.32 Victoria’s
argument that reason was a precondition for ownership assumed that it was the
Pope’s duty not only to introduce and enforce Christianity, but also to wage war
against Indians if they were not faithful.33 Victoria argued that the Law of Nations,
which connected all nations and peoples by the virtues of natural law, imposed a duty
to respect a nation’s right to pass freely, carry out commerce, and spread
Christianity.34 Although Victoria rejected the Doctrine of Title by Discovery, he
argued that the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas were subject to the binding
principles of the Law of Nations upon contact and were subject to punishment for
transgressions committed against its universal principles.35
C. English Application of the Doctrine of Discovery in North America
While the Spanish Crown’s policy in the Americas revolved around enforcing
the hierarchical aims of the Catholic Church, Queen Elizabeth established the
English Protestant Church in 1570 and charted her own course in the New World.36
A substantial difference between the policies of Spain and England during the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
See id.
Williams, supra note 10, at 70-85.
WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 99
Id. at 99.
Id. at 97.
See id. at 104-05.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 107.
See id. at 157-160.
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colonial era was Queen Elizabeth’s belief that reason was not the basis for rights and
that property title derived from physical occupation of land.37
In 1608, Lord Coke presided over Calvin’s Case and wrote a legal opinion that
laid out the rights possessed by non-English subjects under the dominion of the
Crown.38 Coke distinguished between the rights of “aliens in league” with England,
such as France, Spain, and Germany, and infidel kingdoms, such as those discovered
in the Americas.39 Coke’s opinion argued that aliens in league could own property
and maintain actions to defend themselves, while infidels were perpetual enemies
whose non-Christian ideals were a source of hostility that justified the use of force
by the Crown.40 Coke also wrote that the non-conformity of the infidels’ laws with
Christianity rendered them abrogated upon contact and thus, immediately subject to
replacement with the supreme dominion of the Crown.41
Monarchs, explorers, and colonists used natural law foundations of the Law of
Nations to justify the imposition of a European-based hierarchy over indigenous
peoples.42 In their minds, application of the Law of Nations, which came to be
known as the Doctrine of Discovery in the United States, legitimized the subversion
of indigenous rights in the name of a “mythic vision quest of a higher law
commanding and uniting all men.”43 Implicit in the application of these
“universally” recognized principles was the assumed inferiority of the indigenous
inhabitants of what is now called North America. Such assumptions heavily
influenced Western concepts of property ownership and are engrained in American
jurisprudence.
D. The Marshall Trilogy
The “Marshall Trilogy” includes three Supreme Court decisions penned by
Chief Justice John Marshall between 1823 and 1832.44 These three opinions
galvanized the influence of the Doctrine of Discovery on American jurisprudence
and resulted in several landmark principles that are the foundational elements of
federal Indian law. The Marshall Trilogy developed three major common law
doctrines: (i) Indian tribes are subject to the sovereign will of the United States,
which, as the sovereign that displaced the previously dominant European nations,
possesses plenary power over indigenous affairs (an evolution of the Doctrine of
Discovery); (ii) Indian tribes are recognized under the United States Constitution as
distinct sovereigns whose inherent authority to self-govern predates, and is
independent of, the jurisdiction vested in the states; and (iii) the United States has

37. Id. at 158.
38. Williams, supra note 9, at 239-40.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 250-51.
43. Id. at 251.
44. The trilogy includes Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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assumed the role of a trustee and must protect federally recognized Indian tribes to
whom the United States owes a special trust responsibility.45
1. Johnson v. M’Intosh
Johnson was the first of the Marshall Trilogy opinions. Although Johnson
addressed the issue of tribal property rights, it was one of the Supreme Court’s first
efforts to mask the inherently discriminatory policies of the United States’ property
system through the use of the Doctrine of Discovery and the portrayal of a benevolent
and Christian federal government.46
The issue in Johnson was whether Indian tribes possessed the power to alienate
land to private individuals. Thomas Johnson purportedly acquired the land in
question from the Piankeshaw Indians of Illinois through separate purchases in 1773
and 1775.47 Subsequently, in 1818 William M’Intosh received a patent from the
federal government for lands in Illinois that included Johnson’s two tracts.48 In
holding that the sales made by the Piankeshaw to Johnson were ineffective to transfer
a fee title, Marshall engaged in a discussion of the rights of Native Americans that
inserted the discriminatory Law of Nations into American jurisprudence as the
Doctrine of Discovery.49
Marshall’s opinion validated the inability of the Piankeshaw to transfer
legitimate title to property through an explanation of the rights that natives retained
after contact with Europeans.50 Marshall wrote that all European nations
acknowledged the principle that the discovery of lands inhabited by native people
gave title to the discovering nation.51 The rights of the indigenous inhabitants were
“in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily to a considerable extent,
impaired.”52 Marshall’s opinion restated the conception that indigenous rights were
espoused by colonial European powers and the Doctrine of Discovery’s foundational
principle that the discovery of land by a Christian sovereign necessarily impaired
indigenous rights to complete sovereignty and to sell or dispose of land.53 According
to Marshall, the British Crown’s “discovery” of North America and founding of the
colonies vested the sovereign with ultimate dominion and title to all lands within
colonial boundaries, with recognition of only a tribal right to occupancy, which was
subject to extinguishment by the Crown.54 The American Revolution and the
establishment of the United States automatically transferred ultimate title to all lands

45. See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
46. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE
MASKING OF JUSTICE 13 (1997).
47. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 553-54.
48. Id. at 560.
49. Id. at 567-68.
50. Id. at 568 (“Such, then, being the nature of the Indian title to lands, the extent of their right of
alienation must depend upon the laws of the dominion under which they live.”).
51. Id. at 567.
52. Id. at 574.
53. Id. at 574.
54. Id. at 587.
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previously held by the Crown to the new federal government.55 Marshall did not
question the Law of Nations or the Doctrine of Discovery, noting that “if the
principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country
has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
questioned.”56
After using the Doctrine of Discovery to justify the denial of full property rights
to land occupied by Indian tribes in Johnson, Marshall resurrected the same themes
in the rest of the Marshall Trilogy to declare the United States as the benevolent
protector of indigenous people against intrusive state governments.
2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia involved a prayer for relief by the Cherokee Nation
from state laws allegedly designed to “annihilate the Cherokees as a political society,
and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured
to them by the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.”57
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Marshall held that the Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation’s action.58 Marshall interpreted the Commerce
Clause59 to mean that Indian tribes were not foreign nations or states within the
meaning of the Constitution.60 He explained that tribes were domestic dependent
nations, rather than foreign nations, whose relationship to the United States
“resemble[d] that of a ward to his guardian.”61
The Doctrine of Discovery was the legal foundation upon which Marshall rested
his holding that tribes are domestic dependent nations and not foreign states.62
According to Marshall, the placement of Indian tribes within the jurisdictional
boundaries and under the protection of the United States was an ipso facto function
of the Doctrine of Discovery.
3. Worcester v. Georgia
In Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court vacated Samuel Worcester’s
conviction for violation of a state law that criminalized the act of “residing within
the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license.”63 Worcester, a citizen of
Vermont, was a missionary who preached and translated scripture into the Cherokee

55. Id. at 584.
56. Id. at 591.
57. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831).
58. Id. at 20.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes.”).
60. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15.
61. Id. at 10.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 537 (1832).
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language.64 He argued that the Georgia law violated the Constitution and treaties
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation.65
To determine the constitutionality of the Georgia law, Chief Justice Marshall
recited the Doctrine of Discovery with a focus on the jurisdictional primacy of the
dominant “discovering” sovereign, as opposed to its chartered instrumentalities or
political subdivisions.66 Embedded within this power dynamic, Marshall wrote, was
the principle that “the strong hand” of the national government served as a beneficial
protector of the indigenous inhabitants “from intrusions into their country, from
encroachments on their lands, and from those acts of violence.”67 In this vein,
treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the United States recognized the Cherokee
right of self-government, albeit under the protection of the United States.68 Marshall
went on to summarize the body of federal law regarding the rights of sovereign Tribal
nations as one that considered the rights and resources of sovereign Tribal nations to
be “completely separated from that of states,” with all intercourse to “be carried on
exclusively by the government of the union.”69 He further wrote that the Constitution
contemplated Tribal nations as “distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial,” now subject to the protection of the United States.70 Based on
these principles, Marshall concluded that the Georgia law was void and in violation
of federal law.71
The President in 1832, Andrew Jackson, is reported to have infamously said in
response to Worcester that, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it.”72 The removal of the Cherokee Nation along the Trail of Tears followed
shortly thereafter.73 In the northeastern United States, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and then the State of Maine took their own unconstitutional approach
to dealings with the Wabanaki Nations.
II. EARLY AMERICAN-WABANAKI DEALINGS
This Section provides background information on the Wabanaki Nations, their
contributions to the American Revolution, and how the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and then the State of Maine treated them in the period leading up to
the 1970s.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
2008).
73.

Id. at 538.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 559-61.
Id. at 562.
ROBERT T. ANDERSON, ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 73 (4th ed.
Id. at 72-74.
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A. Background on the Wabanaki: the Original American Allies
The Wabanaki Confederacy historically consisted of five separate Tribal
nations, located in what is now the Canadian Maritimes, Quebec, and New England.
The Wabanaki have inhabited their ancestral territory since the glaciers began to
recede and still share many linguistic and cultural similarities today.
The Wabanaki historically managed affairs among their own nations and
between other confederacies, such as the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, pursuant to
ancient understandings of interconnectedness and symbiosis among all living and
natural beings. Traditional Wabanaki law instructs how the people are to coexist
within a familial structure rooted in the natural world.74 Among the Wabanaki
Confederacy’s principal nations, the Penobscot and the Passamaquoddy are the elder
brothers and the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet are the younger brothers, with all other
elements of the natural world (e.g., animals, plants, birds, fish) connected through
similar understandings of kinship.75 In the Passamaquoddy-Maliseet language, the
word to describe a treaty is lakatuwakon, which means “kinship.” In contrast, the
English word “treaty” derives from the Latin word tracatus, which means handling,
bargaining, or managing something.76 The juxtaposition of the origins of these
words lays bare the stark contrast between Wabanaki and European values.
The Wabanaki model of stewardship resulted in an extraordinarily healthy
ecosystem that was highly attractive to explorers originating from Europe. Over the
millennia, the Wabanaki sustained themselves upon a vast fresh water and marine
environment that allowed all manners of plant, animal, and marine life to flourish.
The identity and the name of the people came to reflect the places that they lived and
the things that they did.77 Europeans took note of the abundant populations of fish
and the seemingly endless troves of virgin timber, and a geopolitical battle for control
of the Dawnland commenced. 78 In particular, the French, the British, and then the
Americans vied for positive diplomatic, military, and trade relationships with the
Wabanaki Nations, whose military might was feared in Quebec, the Maritimes, and
much of rural New England.79
B. The Treaty of Watertown and the American Revolution
Before, during, and even after the Revolutionary War, British and American
efforts to garner and maintain support from the Wabanaki persisted as the parties
74. KAYANESENH (PAUL WILLIAMS), PESKOTOMUHKATIQ: THE JOURNEY CONTINUES 6-7 (Kanatiio
(Allen Gabriel) ed., 2016).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 6.
77. For example, the Passamaquoddy call themselves Peskotomuhkati which means the people who
spear pollock, a fish that only lives in saltwater.
78. In the Passamaquoddy-Maliseet language, the Wabanaki people refer to themselves as the “people
of the dawnland.” See “Waponahkew,” PASSAMAQUODDY-MALISEET LANGUAGE PORTAL, https://
pmportal.org/dictionary/waponahkew [https://perma.cc/7BQD-PTAJ] (last visited May 13, 2022).
79. See generally The Catholic Indians and the American Revolution, 4 AM. CATHOLIC HIST. RSCHS.
193, 193 (July 1908) (stating that the Micmacs, the Maliseet, the Passamaquoddy, and the Penobscot,
commonly called the “Eastern Indians,” “were an important factor in the events of the Revolutionary War”
and “could have ‘destroyed or driven away every inhabitant east of the Penobscot’”); see also
Passamaquoddy Indian Papers, supra note 5.
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executed multiple Peace and Friendship treaties on both sides of what became the
border.80 The British dispatched agents to doggedly pursue friendly relations with
Wabanaki leaders,81 while the American colonial governments and then the
Continental Congress, including General George Washington, consistently and
actively sought support from Wabanaki interests.82 The Continental Congress took
action to direct and fund the activities of John Allan, a diplomat among the Wabanaki
and an army colonel, to establish positive trade and political relations with the
Tribe.83 Washington himself wrote letters to the Passamaquoddy and Maliseet
Chiefs on Christmas Eve of 1776, the day before he led American forces in his iconic
crossing of the Delaware River.84
Ultimately, the Americans made the biggest international splash when, within
weeks, they signed both the Declaration of Independence and the fledgling country’s
first Peace and Friendship treaty with foreign states—in this case, the Wabanaki
Nations. Thus, the Wabanaki were the first nations to recognize the sovereignty of
the United States. The primary objective of the negotiations, held in Watertown,
Massachusetts, was for the Americans to secure military support through the
immediate provision of Wabanaki warriors to General Washington’s ranks and
through the recruitment of additional fighters.85 George Washington personally
wrote to Wabanaki leaders to urge their presence at the treaty conference.86
The Treaty of Watertown embodied parties’ sovereign commitments of mutual
defense, political alliance, and friendship.87 In exchange for regional military and
diplomatic clout, the United States offered to protect and aid the Wabanaki against

80. See Wicken, Fact sheet on Peace and Friendship Treaties in the Maritimes and Gaspé, GOV’T OF
CAN., https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100028599/1539609517566 [https://perma.cc/AVP7QZDN] (last visited May 13, 2021) (discussing various treaties among the Wabanaki and the British
Crown between 1760 and 1780); The Catholic Indians and the American Revolution, supra note 79, at
194-202; see, e.g., Treaty of Watertown, supra note 1.
81. See Letter from Col. John Allan, Continental Army, to Major General William Heather,
Continental Army (May 18, 1779), in FREDERIC KIDDER & GEORGE HAYWARD ALLEN, MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MAINE AND NOVA SCOTIA DURING THE REVOLUTION 259-60 (Frederic Kidder
eds., 1867); Richard I. Hunt Jr., British-American Rivalry for the Support of the Indians of Maine and
Nova Scotia, 1775-1783, U. ME. ELEC. THESES & DISSERTATIONS, Jan. 1973, at 1, 61 [hereinafter Treaty
of Watertown Minutes] (describing gifts given by the British to Maliseet Chiefs).
82. The Catholic Indians and the American Revolution ., supra note 79, at 193-202, 206 (summarizing
communications between Wabanaki and Continental leaders during the early part of the American
Revolution); Letter from GW to St. Johns Tribe, supra note 4; Letter from GW to Passamaquoddy Tribe,
supra note 4; see also Speeches of the Caughnawaga, St. Johns, and Passamaquoddy Indians, 31 January
1776, FOUNDERS ONLINE NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/0303-02-0161 [https://perma.cc/575X-669H] (last visited May 13, 2022) (summarizing a January 31, 1776
meeting with General George Washington, the Passamaquoddy, and the Maliseet).
83. The Catholic Indians and the American Revolution, supra note 79, at 212-13 (instructions of the
Continental Congress to Colonel John Allan, Agent of the Catholic Indians of St. Johns River and Nova
Scotia).
84. Letter from GW to St. Johns Tribe, supra note 4; Letter from GW to Passamaquoddy Tribe, supra
note 4.
85. See generally Treaty of Watertown Minutes, supra note 81, at 8-10.
86. Id. at 2-3 (detailing correspondence presented in the conference from February and October 1775
between Ambrose Bear (St. Aubin), a Maliseet Chief, and General George Washington, in which General
Washington requested the presence of the Wabanaki at a treaty conference the following spring).
87. Treaty of Watertown, supra note 1, at art. 1-2.

2022]

ELI-TPITAHATOMEK TPASKUWAKONOL WAPONAHKIK

221

not only the British, but also the “[s]ubjects of . . . Massachusetts Bay, or of any other
of the United States of America.”88 The ensuing alliance proved geopolitically
significant and established the northern border of the United States by bisecting
Wabanaki territory held by the Micmac, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy.89
The temporal proximity between the execution of the Declaration of
Independence and the Treaty of Watertown was significant. The parties completed
execution of the Treaty of Watertown on July 19, 1776 after days of negotiations,
meaning the treaty parties were traveling to or already convened in Watertown when
the execution of the Declaration occurred in Philadelphia.90 In fact, on July 16, 1776,
James Bowdoin, president of the Council of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which
negotiated the treaty for the Americans, shared news of the Declaration’s signing
with individuals gathered at the Wabanaki treaty negotiations.91 Wabanaki reticence
over the subject of American independence and the new country’s sovereign right to
enter into diplomatic relations is apparent from the treaty notes92 and the text of the
treaty itself.93 In response to a reading of the Declaration and an explicit affirmation
by the Americans of their newfound sovereign power to conduct diplomacy and
wage war, Maliseet Chief Ambrose Bear responded, “[w]e like it well.”94 Wabanaki
interpreters then translated and read the text of the treaty before it was executed.95
The Wabanaki instantaneously contributed military and diplomatic resources to
the Americans’ revolutionary cause. Wabanaki negotiators for the Treaty of
Watertown pledged hundreds of warriors for immediate service during the
negotiations and agreed to engage in a recruitment effort among the Penobscot and
Passamaquoddy in particular.96 In subsequent written correspondence to the
Wabanaki, General Washington reiterated his desires for peace and friendship with
them and renewed his hope that more Wabanaki warriors would bolster the ranks of
the Continental Army.97 Wabanaki warriors ultimately served in the American
Revolution in various ways in fulfillment of their treaty obligations.98

88. Id. at art. 3.
89. Passamaquoddy Indian Papers, supra note 5.
90. See generally id.
91. Treaty of Watertown Minutes, supra note 81, at 10-11.
92. See id. (describing a reading of the Declaration and a discussion of the same, as well as Maliseet
Chief Ambrose Bear’s responsive statement: “[w]e like it well.”).
93. See Treaty of Watertown, supra note 1 (“United States of America in General Congress
Assembled have in the name, and by the Authority of the Good people of these Colonies Solemnly publish
and declare, that these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be free and Independent States; that
they are absolved from all Allegiances to the British Crown; and that all political connection between
them and the State of Great Britain is and ought to be dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States
they have power to Levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all
other Acts and things which Independent States may of Right do.”).
94. Treaty of Watertown Minutes, supra note 81, at 11.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 9; see also Treaty of Watertown, supra note 1, at art. 8.
97. Letter from GW to St. Johns Tribe, supra note 4; Letter from GW to Passamaquoddy Tribe, supra
note 4.
98. See Passamaquoddy Indian Papers, supra note 5 (summarizing Passamaquoddy and Maliseet
efforts in the war); Notes of Col. John Allan (Nov. 13, 1778), in FREDERIC KIDDER & GEORGE HAYWARD
ALLEN, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MAINE AND NOVA SCOTIA DURING THE REVOLUTION 257
(Frederic Kidder ed., 1867) (describing military expeditions involving Penobscot citizens); 159 Cong.

222

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

C. Recognition of Wabanaki-American Relations in the New Country
Early dealings between the Wabanaki and the recently victorious United States
did not go as planned for the Wabanaki.99 In the years just before and after the end
of the Revolutionary War, the Wabanaki communicated with the Continental
Congress through Colonel John Allan, who Congress appointed as Agent for Indian
Affairs in the Eastern Department of the United States in the late 1770s.100 In 1780,
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts began purchasing supplies for Allan to provide
to the Wabanaki, with “said sum to be charged to the United States.”101 The
Commonwealth made such commitments of resources “in full confidence that
Congress would be answerable for the same” because Congress had a practice of
dealing with the Wabanaki since the country’s inception.102 Thus, the Wabanaki,
Massachusetts, and Congress operated under the clear assumption that the tribes
were under federal jurisdiction, albeit with direct support from Massachusetts.
In 1784, congressionally-appointed Indian Agent Colonel John Allan wrote to
Maliseet and Passamaquoddy leaders regarding a border dispute over the line of
demarcation between the United States and what was then Nova Scotia. In his letter,
Allan noted the United States’ intention to ascertain proper boundaries that did not
claim any native lands.103 He assured the tribes that they could pursue their “suits
on the several streams as usual,” without fear of harassment.104 However, by the
early 1790s, many feared that another war with Great Britain was inevitable, as the
British had reportedly refused to relinquish certain military posts and were supplying
Tribal nations in the western United States with weapons.105 In the eastern United
States, the Americans had declined to ratify wartime agreements with the Wabanaki
nations regarding lands and military alliances. According to a 1793 report by

Rec. S4581 (daily ed. June 18, 2013) (statement of Senator Susan Collins regarding the historic
significance of Passamaquoddy military contributions made during the Battle of Machias in 1775); COLIN
G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY: CRISIS AND DIVERSITY IN NATIVE
AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 36 (1995) (noting Penobscot contributions to the United States’ Penobscot Bay
Expedition, which occurred in the summer of 1779).
99. See Passamaquoddy Indian Papers, supra note 5.
100. See Letter from John Allan, Agent for Indian Affairs, U.S. Eastern Dept., to the Chiefs of the
Meresheete and Passamaquoddy Tribes (Feb. 23, 1784), in FREDERIC KIDDER & GEORGE HAYWARD
ALLEN, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MAINE AND NOVA SCOTIA DURING THE REVOLUTION 29798 (Frederic Kidder ed., 1867); DONALD SOCTOMAH, SAVE THE LAND FOR THE CHILDREN 1800-1850:
PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBAL LIFE AND TIMES IN MAINE AND NEW BRUNSWICK 1 (2009).
101. SOCTOMAH, supra note 100, at 1 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Laws and Resolves of
Massachusetts, 1781, Chapter 83, Page 177).
102. Id. (quoting Laws and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1781, page 807) (internal quotations omitted);
see also id. at 2 (citations omitted) (stating that “[t]he President inform the Governor of Massachusetts
that Congress, sensible of the importance of supporting the Eastern Indian Department under the
superintendence of Col. John Allen [sic], approve of the care of the Executive of Massachusetts in making
from time to time necessary provision of the same, and they are requested to continue such supplies and
charge the same to the United States”).
103. Letter from John Allan, Agent for Indian Affairs, U.S. Eastern Dept., to the Chiefs of the
Meresheete and Pasamaquoddy Tribes (Feb. 23, 1784), supra note 100.
104. Id. at 298.
105. See Col. Allan’s Report on the Indians of Maine and New Brunswick, in 1793, in FREDERIC
KIDDER & GEORGE HAYWARD ALLEN, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MAINE AND NOVA SCOTIA
DURING THE REVOLUTION 304 (Frederic Kidder ed., 1867).
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Colonel Allan, the British used the opening to court the tribes, who threatened to pull
out of their military and diplomatic alliances with the Americans if tribal lands were
not protected.106
In response, the Americans started to fulfill certain long overdue promises to the
Wabanaki. Most significantly, the Massachusetts, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot
executed treaties to protect aboriginal title to the tribes’ most important remaining
land holdings, resolve simmering tensions between settlers and Wabanaki, and
reserve certain other rights.107 In particular, the Passamaquoddy Treaty of 1794
reserved explicitly defined land areas, including (i) numerous islands, (ii) the
“privilege” to fish on both branches of the St. Croix River “without hindrance or
molestation,” and (iii) the “privilege” to utilize multiple carrying places for the
purpose of accessing traditional fishing grounds in fresh and saltwater.108 According
to 1793 correspondence between Wabanaki Chiefs and Massachusetts, the
reservation of lands on both fresh and saltwater in and around the St. Croix River
watershed and access to fishing in the sea constituted “promises made in War.”109
In 1796, after execution of the Passamaquoddy Treaty of 1794, the border
dispute between the United States and Nova Scotia complained about by the
Passamaquoddy and Maliseet was finally resolved. The Passamaquoddy Tribe
previously informed the Americans that it did not wish for its treaty-reserved lands
and fishing areas to be bisected by the border. The Tribe even supplied
Passamaquoddy guides to help navigate the area necessary to settle the international
dispute.110 Despite Chief Neptune’s attempts to persuade the boundary commission
to adopt a border that would leave all Passamaquoddy hunting and fishing grounds
in the United States, the Commission rebuffed him and settled on a line that
106. Id. at 315-16.
107. See Treaty Between the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Sept.
29, 1794, supra note 6; Treaty Between the Penobscot and Massachusetts, Aug. 8, 1796, in Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, Penobscot Nation v. Frey, Nos. 16-1424, 16-1435, 16-1474, 16-1482, at 319a (petition
for cert. filed Dec. 7, 2021).
108. Treaty between the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Sept. 29,
1794, supra note 6. The treaty reserves “all those islands lying and being in Schoodic River, between the
falls at the head of the tide, and the falls below the forks of said river where the north branch and west
branch parts; being fifteen in number, containing one hundred acres more or less[;]” Indian Township
“containing about twenty-three thousand acres more or less;” “Lire’s Island lying in front of said
township, containing ten acres more or less; together with one hundred acres of land lying on Nemcass
Point adjoining the west side of said township;” “Pine Island lying to the westward of said Nemcass Point,
containing one hundred and fifty acres, more or less;” an assignment “to said Indians the privilege of
fishing on both branches of the river Schoodic without hindrance or molestation and the privilege of
passing the said river over the different carrying places thereon;” an assignment “and set off to said Indians
ten acres of land more or less at Pleasant Point[;]” and “also a privilege of setting down at the carrying
place at West Quoddy between the Bay of West Quoddy and the bay of Fundy, to contain fifty acres.” Id.
109. Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, and Mi’kmaq Petition to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Mar.
27, 1793) (on file with authors); see Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d
370, 373 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that the Passamaquoddy Tribe “pledged its support to the American
Colonies during the Revolutionary War in exchange for promises by John Allan, Indian agent for the
Continental Congress, that the Tribe would be given ammunition for hunting, protection for their game
and hunting grounds, regulation of trade to prevent imposition, the exclusive right to hunt beaver, the free
exercise of religion, and a clergyman”).
110. See Passamaquoddy Indian Papers, supra note 5; John Allan’s Report on the Negotiation with the
Passamaquoddy Tribe and the 1794 Treaty (Nov. 28, 1794) (on file with authors).
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effectively divided Passamaquoddy territory between the United States and Canada.
Wabanaki efforts to protect reserved lands and resources reappeared when Maine
vied for statehood in 1820.
D. Maine Statehood
Maine became a state in 1820 as part of a national bargain intended to stave off
a civil war over slavery.111 This grand bargain, the Missouri Compromise, occurred
in 1820 because the United States was breaking under the weight of slavery and there
were two states, with diametrically opposed views on slavery, who wished to be
admitted to the Union.112 Mainers made various attempts to achieve statehood prior
to 1820, but they all failed until the fragility of the American democracy was so
obvious that a deal became necessary to preserve the balance of voting power in
Congress between slave states and free states.113
The Act of Congress that specifically authorized Maine’s separation from
Massachusetts noted Massachusetts’s consent to the separation and Maine’s
adoption of a constitution.114 The original version of Maine’s Constitution required
the state to “assume and perform all the duties and obligations” of Massachusetts
under the treaties entered into with the Wabanaki, including the Passamaquoddy and
Penobscot nations.115 According to the First Circuit, “[t]he Maine Constitution, with
the above quoted provision relating to the Indians, was read in the [United States]
Senate, referred to committee, and finally declared by Congress to be established.”116
Massachusetts paid Maine $30,000 as consideration for fulfillment of the treaty
obligations,117 and the Maine Legislature ordered the Secretary of State to maintain
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy treaties “on file in the Secretary’s office . . . as
evidence of their title to their lands, and their claims against the State.”118 The tribes
undoubtedly felt that the explicit reference to their treaties in the Maine Constitution

111. See Robert E. Hall, Maine’s Admission to the Union (1920), in SPRAGUE’S JOURNAL OF MAINE
HISTORY 8-14 (John Francis Sprague ed., 1920).
112. Id.
113. See generally Hall, supra note 111, at 8-14; An Act of Separation, 3 Stat. 544 (1820) (ratifying
an act of Massachusetts that sought to legally separate Maine from Massachusetts); The Missouri
Compromise, 3 Stat. 545 (1820) (repealed 1954); Missouri Compromise: Primary Documents in
American History, LIBR. OF CONG., https://guides.loc.gov/missouri-compromise [https://perma.cc/Y2
FM-MVN4] (last visited May 13, 2022).
114. An Act for the Admission of the State of Maine into the Union, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 544, 544 (1820).
115. Me. Const. art. X, § 5. Section 5 is effective but is omitted from printing. Me. Const. art. X, § 7;
see also Me. Const. art. X, § 5 (“The new State shall, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made
for that purpose, assume and perform all the duties and obligations of this Commonwealth, towards the
Indians within said District of Maine, whether the same arises from treaties, or otherwise; and for this
purpose shall obtain the assent of said Indians, and their release to this Commonwealth of claims and
stipulations arising under the treaty at present existing between the said Commonwealth and said
Indians.”).
116. Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1975).
117. See GOVERNOR’S MESSAGE, Resolves, 4th Leg., Jan. Sess. 293, 301 (Me. 1824).
118. SOCTOMAH, supra note 100, at 122.
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would protect their hunting and fishing rights.119 Nonetheless, Maine showed a total
lack of regard for the rights of the Wabanaki until fallout from 1970s federal court
decisions forced the state’s begrudging acknowledgment of the tribes’ inherent
sovereignty.
Historical records reflect that Wabanaki lands and resources, in particular, were
subject to active exploitation by Maine almost as soon as the state entered the
Union.120 Further, Maine’s legislative record includes numerous examples of how
the state alienated treaty-reserved natural resources, including lands and timber,
without tribal consent121 and in direct contravention of both the state constitution and
federal law, which both prohibited the alienation of tribal lands without proper
consent.122 According to the First Circuit’s tally in Joint Tribal Council of the
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, between 1820 and 1975, the state enacted
approximately 350 laws to regulate all facets of Passamaquoddy life, including
agriculture, housing, basic necessities such as blankets and wood, educational
services, health care, housing, infrastructure such as roads and water, and legal
representation.123 Upset with the violation of their treaty rights, which the
Passamaquoddy felt that they had earned during the American Revolution,
Passamaquoddy representatives specifically challenged their treatment by Maine in
the courts of public opinion and of law but to no avail. 124 Instead, Maine’s highest
court charted a bizarre deviation from the recently decided Marshall Trilogy to
fashion a unique blend of paternalism and racism intended to justify Maine’s
subjugation and oppression of the Wabanaki.
E. Flouting Federal Law and the Maine Constitution
From 1820-1975, Maine courts used inflammatory language while repeatedly
ignoring principles of federal Indian law to justify holdings that blatantly violated
the rights of the Wabanaki. The first of these cases was Murch v. Tomer,125 which

119. See John Francis Sprague, Indian Treaties of Maine, in SPRAGUE’S JOURNAL OF MAINE HISTORY
183, 188 (1920) (also quoted in compilations of Passamaquoddy history created by the Passamaquoddy
Tribal Historian).
120. See, e.g., id. at 36-49 (providing a timeline from January 1821 to January 1825 which, among
other things, lists state actions that violated tribal property rights); Francis J. O’Toole & Thomas N.
Tureen, State Power and the Passamaquoddy Tribe: “A Gross National Hypocrisy?”, 23 ME. L. REV. 1,
10-11 (1971) (listing Maine laws passed without Passamaquoddy consent which authorized the leasing of
tribal lands for 999 years, authorized the sale of timber and hay from tribal lands, and “granted road, rail
and utility rights-of-way” through tribal lands).
121. See Francis J. O’Toole & Thomas N. Tureen, State Power and the Passamaquoddy Tribe: “A
Gross National Hypocrisy?”, 23 ME. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1971).
122. Me. Const. art. X, § 5; An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33,
1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177).
123. Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d at 374 (1st Cir. 1975).
124. See SOCTOMAH, supra note 100, at 36 (transcribing the petition of Passamaquoddy citizen Captain
Deacon Sockabasin, which complained about the negative impact of the destruction of fish, game, and
timber stock on the Passamaquoddy people’s ability to sustain themselves); Louis Mitchell,
Representative of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, Speech to the Sixty-Third Maine Legislature 1-8 (Mar. 9,
1887) (transcript available at Wabanaki.com).
125. Murch v. Tomer, 212 Me. 535, 535 (1842) (involving the question of whether a Penobscot citizen
could be sued in Maine courts).

226

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

was decided just ten years after Worcester v. Georgia rejected Georgia’s attempt to
regulate affairs within Cherokee territory.126 In Murch, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, wrote “[i]mbecility on their part, and the dictates
of humanity on ours, have necessarily prescribed to them their subjection to our
paternal control; in disregard of some, at least of abstract principles of the rights of
man.”127 The Law Court’s disregard for the humanity of native people in Murch was
just a preview of how the court would interpret native property rights.
In Penobscot Tribe of Indians v. Veazie,128 decided in 1870, Maine’s highest
court struck down a Penobscot effort to recover possession of islands in the
Penobscot River. The Penobscot claimed to have reserved the islands in question
through a 1796 treaty with Massachusetts and challenged possession of the islands
by the heirs of Veazie, who claimed to have received the land from a private citizen
in 1837.129 The court rejected the Penobscot’s claim through a misapplication of the
Doctrine of Discovery and the holding of Johnson v. M’Intosh in a manner that
presaged the very land claims that would later roil Maine in the 20th Century:
[A] title derived from the government is superior to one derived from the aborigines;
and that if it should now be held otherwise, and it should also be held that the statute
of limitations is no bar to a recovery under an Indian title, a door would be opened
to endless litigation, and thousands of titles, now considered perfectly secure, would
be instantly destroyed.130

And, just like that, Maine’s highest court disregarded the treaties engrained in
its own constitution. The court clearly understood the Doctrine of Discovery insofar
as it applied to the primacy of a colonial government’s title vis-à-vis a “discovered”
tribe, but the court failed to appreciate the distinction between a nation-state and a
political subdivision thereof.
Just a few years later, in 1875, Maine took an even more unusual step with
respect to the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot treaties that it was constitutionally
obligated to uphold. As though the Veazie case and the related Granger case131
forever erased all Wabanaki rights in Maine, the Maine Constitution was amended
to omit from printing, but not to remove, Article X, Section 5, which addresses the
Wabanaki treaty obligations. Significantly, as the Maine Constitution currently
provides, “this [omission from printing] shall not impair the validity of acts under
those sections; and said section 5 [concerning treaties] shall remain in full force, as
part of the Constitution.”132 Although no one knows exactly why the treaty provision
remains an unprinted part of the Maine Constitution,133 its omission paved the way
126. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
127. Murch, 212 Me. at 538.
128. Penobscot Tribe of Indians v. Veazie, 58 Me. 402, 408 (1870).
129. Id. at 406-08.
130. Id. at 406-07.
131. Granger v. Avery, 64 Me. 292, 296 (1874) (holding that the Passamaquoddy had no claim to
islands reserved to the tribe in its 1794 treaty because the Commonwealth of Massachusetts separately
deeded the islands to a private citizen).
132. Me. Const. art. X, § 7.
133. See Colin Woodard, The Passamaquoddy’s Land Claim Case Takes Shape, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (July 5, 2014), https://www.pressherald.com/2014/07/05/the-passamaquoddys-land-claim-casetakes-shape/ [https://perma.cc/6CL3-8636].
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for more state actions that utterly disregarded the treaty-reserved rights of the
Passamaquoddy.
In 1892, in State v. Newell, the Law Court upheld the conviction of Peter Newell,
a member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, for killing two deer in violation of state
law.134 Mr. Newell claimed his actions were lawful on account of the Tribe’s
expressly reserved hunting, fishing, and fowling rights in its treaties and argued that
those treaties had been incorporated into the Maine Constitution.135 Based upon this,
Newell reasoned that the state legislature could not regulate his hunting and fishing
rights.136 The court, with full vigor, dismissed any privileges based on the treaties
because the Passamaquoddy Tribe was functus officio:
One [sic] party to [the treaties], the Indians, have wholly lost their political
organization and their political existence. There has been no continuity or
succession of political life and power . . . . They cannot make war or peace; cannot
make treaties; cannot make laws; cannot punish crime; cannot administer even civil
justice among themselves . . . . They are as completely subject to the State as any
other inhabitants can be.137

The court, in effectively denying the existence of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, also
turned a blind eye to the historic alliances of the Passamaquoddy and the United
States by finding the Treaty of 1794 was “simply a grant by the commonwealth to
the Passamaquoddy tribe of Indians of certain lands, and the privilege of fishing in
the Schoodiac river, in consideration of their releasing all claims to other lands in the
commonwealth.”138 And the court determined that “[c]learly the defendant gains no
right to hunt under that grant.”139 The state likely viewed its victory in Newell as a
triumphant precedent-setting decision that would forever obstruct the ability of the
Wabanaki to wield sovereign rights in Maine.140 The decision resulted in a number
of major violations of Passamaquoddy property rights over the ensuing decades,
including but not limited to: the flooding of the Passamaquoddy community at Indian
Township to build a dam, the annexation of other lands at Indian Township and
Pleasant Point to build Routes 1 and 190, and the conveyance of tribal treaty lands
to powerful corporations and private citizens.141 However, such confidence would
ultimately be misplaced as the decisions of Maine’s highest court regarding tribal
rights were incorrect as a matter of law, and the Passamaquoddy knew it.
III. THE SETTLEMENT ACT ERA
Maine successfully maintained its colonial domination over the Wabanaki until
the 1960s and 1970s. In 1975, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled

134. State v. Newell, 84 Me. 465, 24 A. 943 (1892).
135. Id. at 466, 24 A. at 943.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 468, 24 A. at 944.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1975)
(rejecting Maine’s argument that State v. Newell preempted the United States’ ability to maintain a trust
relationship with the Passamaquoddy Tribe).
141. See Woodard, supra note 153.
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in a historic decision that the Passamaquoddy Tribe was an Indian tribe to whom the
United States owed a special trust responsibility.142 In finding that the United States
was obligated to protect Passamaquoddy interests pursuant to the Non-Intercourse
Act, the First Circuit applied the Indian canon of construction, which instructs “that
statutes or treaties relating to the Indians shall be construed liberally and in a nontechnical sense, as the Indians would naturally understand them, and never to the
Indians’ prejudice.” 143 The court then interpreted the Non-Intercourse Act as
applying to the Passamaquoddy even though the federal government did not formally
recognize the Tribe.144 The decision prompted the United States to establish federal
relations with and bring land claims on behalf of the Passamaquoddy and
Penobscot.145
The First Circuit’s decision in Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe
ushered in a new era in Maine in which all principles of federal Indian law, including
common law doctrines, applied to the newly federally recognized Wabanaki Nations.
A. 1975-1979: Application of Federal Common Law to Indian Law Disputes in
Maine
Maine’s anti-Indian animus continued in another First Circuit case, Bottomly v.
Passamaquoddy Tribe, which was a private contract dispute case.146 Bottomly
involved the question of whether the Passamaquoddy Tribe possessed the power of
sovereign immunity from lawsuit, which is an inherent attribute of sovereignty
possessed by Tribal nations.147 As amicus curiae, Maine attempted to argue, without
any supporting legal authority and in contravention of federal Indian common law,
that tribal sovereignty is not an inherent right, but rather is “dependent on a showing
that it had been granted to the tribe by the federal government through explicit
recognition or implicitly through a course of dealing.”148 The state’s argument
amounted to a claim that the Passamaquoddy were an “ethnic association” because
they are “merely remnants or fragments” of a former independent tribe.149 But
Maine’s attack proceeded to incorporate racial stereotypes by claiming only those
“fierce warring tribes of the frontier” enjoy sovereignty because the federal
government had to treat them differently due to their warlike nature.150 The First
Circuit wholly rejected this argument finding that the “state seems to us to
fundamentally misconceive basic principles of federal Indian law.”151 The First
Circuit applied federal Indian common law principles which—contrary to Maine’s

142. Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, 528 F.2d at 379.
143. Id. at 380 (citing Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975)).
144. Id. at 380-81. Maine intervened and pointed to State v. Newell for the proposition that the
Passamaquoddy was not a tribe to whom the United States had any trust responsibility, but the court easily
rejected that argument. Id.
145. See United States v. Maine, No. 1969-ND (D. Me.) (the Penobscot land claims case); United
States v. Maine, No. 1966-ND (D. Me.) (the Passamaquoddy land claims case).
146. Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1979).
147. Id. at 1061-62.
148. Id. at 1065.
149. Id. at 1062-64.
150. Id. at 1064.
151. Id. at 1065.
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contention—do not permit state action or “[t]he mere passage of time with its erosion
of the full exercise of the sovereign powers of a tribal organization” to constitute “an
implicit divestiture” of inherent tribal sovereignty.152 Thus, the court held that the
Passamaquoddy retained its inherent sovereign immunity from suit.
Influenced by the First Circuit’s decisions in Joint Tribal Council of the
Passamaquoddy Tribe and Bottomly, Maine’s highest court exhibited acceptance of
federal Indian common law for the first time in State v. Dana.153 In Dana, the court
addressed whether a significant federal Indian law statute, the Major Crimes Act,
preempted the State of Maine’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction over tribal members
alleged to have committed arson on treaty-reserved Passamaquoddy reservation
lands.154 The Law Court held that Indian country could exist in Maine and that the
Passamaquoddy might actually be a “bona fide” tribe protected under federal law,
“which was not fully recognized by the Superior Court when it failed to arrest the
judgments of conviction now before us.”155
As Congress recognized in its final committee reports on the land claims
settlement in 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit established that
“the Maine Tribes still possess inherent sovereignty to the same extent as other tribes
in the United States”156 and that they were “entitled to protection under federal Indian
common law doctrines.”157 These rulings increased pressure on simultaneously
unfolding efforts to negotiate a settlement of Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, and
Maliseet land claims because, by the late 1970s, the United States filed land claims
cases against the State of Maine on behalf of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot.158
B. The Settlement Acts
Efforts to settle the land claims began in earnest in 1977 after President Jimmy
Carter intervened. At that time, the legal claims of the Passamaquoddy, Penobscot,
and Maliseet covered as much as two-thirds of the State of Maine.159 The claims
complicated the ability of private landowners to alienate land due to clouded title and
obstructed the capacity of municipalities in the state to issue municipal bonds within
the claimed area.160 The combination of threats of violence against the tribes as part
of a “land war,” economic uncertainty from the land claims, and the loss of the state’s
legal control over tribal lands in Maine gave the state significant incentive to resolve
the claims expeditiously.161 As a result, the overall settlement embodied two general

152. Id. at 1065-66.
153. State v. Dana, 404 A.2d 551 (Me. 1979).
154. Id. at 552.
155. Id. at 552.
156. S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 14 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 14 (1980).
157. S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 13 (1980).
158. See United States v. Maine, No. 1969-ND (D. Me.) (the Penobscot land claims case); United
States v. Maine, No. 1966-ND (D. Me.) (the Passamaquoddy land claims case).
159. S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 11 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 11 (1980).
160. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 14 (1980); Joseph G.E. Gousse, Waiting for Gluskabe: An Examination
of Maine’s Colonist Legacy Suffered by Native American Tribes Under the Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act of 1980, 66 ME. L. REV. 536, 546 (2014).
161. See Gousse, supra note 160, at 546-47 (characterizing public outcry against the proposed
settlement).
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goals: (i) forever end Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot land claims in
Maine; and (ii) ensure that the state would have jurisdiction over all facets of
Wabanaki affairs with few exceptions.
The land claims settlement exists in two complementary statutes (collectively
referred to as the “Settlement Acts”). President Carter signed the MICSA into law
in October 1980. MICSA ratified and rendered effective a state law enacted in the
same year, referred to as the Maine Implementing Act (MIA), which generally
memorialized a jurisdictional agreement between the State of Maine and the
Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot with respect to their existing reservations
and new land to be acquired with federal funds by the terms of MICSA. The
Settlement Acts generally sought to: (i) extinguish the tribes’ title to the lands that
were the subject of United States v. Maine, including all lands and natural resources
ceded to Massachusetts and Maine without federal approval as required by the Indian
Non-Intercourse Act (the “land claims”); (ii) appropriate federal dollars to induce the
tribes to enter the settlement; (iii) approve the MIA, including its extension of state
jurisdiction over the tribes; and (iv) delineate the contours of the tribes’ relationship
with the United States.162 Public hearings regarding the settlement, which were held
by state legislators in Maine prior to the enactment of the MIA, evinced strong tribal
opposition to the deal, in part because of the impression among tribal members that
the settlement would amount to a “‘destruction’ of the sovereign rights and
jurisdiction” of the settling tribes.163
The resulting legislative record for MICSA contains specific responses to how
the Settlement Acts would affect the sovereignty of the tribes, their resources, and
their cultures. Instead of destroying the “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” of the
tribes, the legislative record instead shows Congress’ intent to protect the sovereignty
of the settling tribes, particularly with respect to internal tribal matters and hunting
and fishing rights, which the legislative reports characterized as “expressly retained
sovereign activities.”164
In particular, the final committee reports specifically addressed the extent to
which the MICSA ratified, preserved, and extinguished aboriginal title associated
with the transfers and reservations of lands and resources covered by the various
treaties.165 To this point, the reports provide that “the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the
Penobscot Nation will retain as reservations those lands and natural resources166
which were reserved to them in their treaties with Massachusetts and not
subsequently transferred by them.”167 This significant statement from the committee

162. NICOLE FRIEDERICHS ET AL., THE DRAFTING AND ENACTMENT OF THE MAINE INDIAN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT ACT 8 (2017).
163. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 14 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 14 (1980).
164. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 15; S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 14.
165. See Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, § 4(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1785,
1794 (1980).
166. Section 3(b) of MICSA defines “land or natural resources” as including “any real property or
natural resources, or any interest in or right involving any real property or natural resources, including but
without limitation minerals and mineral rights, timber and timber rights, water and water rights, and
hunting and fishing rights.” Id. § 3(b).
167. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 18; see also S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 18 (“[T]he Passamaquoddy Tribe
and the Penobscot Nation will retain as reservations those lands and natural resources which were reserved
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reports must be juxtaposed with section 4 of MICSA, in which Congress deemed
“any treaty, compact, or statute of [Massachusetts and Maine] . . . to have been made
in accordance with the Constitution and all laws of the United States.”168 MICSA
went on to state that “Congress hereby does approve and ratify any such [treaty,
compact, or statute].”169 “Committee reports on a bill are [an] authoritative source
for determining legislative intent.”170 The express terms of the MICSA also
established a baseline principle under which federal laws generally applicable to
tribes, tribal members, and tribal lands, would apply in Maine unless such application
would affect or preempt Maine law.171 Section 16(a) of the MICSA provides that
“[i]n the event a conflict of interpretation between the provisions of the Maine
Implementing Act and this Act should emerge, the provisions of this Act shall
govern.”172 In light of this provision and the fact that, under the United States
Constitution, MIA could not be effective without the consent of Congress, the First
Circuit held that the construction of MIA presents questions of federal law.173
In sum, by preserving the reservations and transfers of rights embodied in the
treaties, and affirmatively approving the state jurisdiction over the tribes through the
MIA, the MICSA embodied a distinctly federal Indian law approach to solving a
complex legal problem that arose from the state’s false assumption of jurisdiction
over the tribes until 1975.
IV. APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW DOCTRINES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN THE
POST-SETTLEMENT ACT ERA
This Section first examines select cases that involved the application of federal
Indian common law doctrines to resolve questions arising under the Settlement Acts
and then explores how such doctrines should also be applicable to the treaty-reserved
and never ceded rights enshrined in the Maine Constitution and ratified in MICSA.
A. Application of Federal Indian Common Law Doctrines After the Settlement Acts
Maine courts wasted little time reverting to legally incorrect, backward-looking
conceptions of tribal sovereignty following enactment of the Settlement Acts. In the
1983 case Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen,174 the Law Court seized upon its first
opportunity to disregard federal Indian law, arrest economic development on the
Penobscot reservation, and claw back the gains in tribal sovereignty under the guise

to them in their treaties with Massachusetts and not subsequently transferred by them.”). But see Maine
Indian Claims Settlement Act, § 12, 94 Stat. at 1796-97 (providing a general discharge of the State of
Maine’s obligations “arising from any treaty or agreement with, or on behalf of any Indian nation”).
168. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, § 4(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 1787.
169. Id.
170. Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 489 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining why the First Circuit
“look[s] to the Committee Report[s] . . . concerning the Settlement Act”).
171. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, § 6(h), 94 Stat. at 1794.
172. Id. at § 16(a).
173. See Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d at 485; Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 708 (1st
Cir. 1999).
174. Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983).
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of statutory interpretation.175 The Penobscot Nation sought an injunction against the
State Attorney General to prevent enforcement of the state bingo law as well as a
declaratory judgment that its on-reservation bingo games were exempt from state
jurisdiction as an “internal tribal matter” within the meaning of MIA. After
concluding a tribe is not eligible to hold a state bingo license, the Law Court outlined
applicable common law precedents, which it felt defined the universe of what
constituted “inherent sovereign authority.”176 After conveniently ignoring the Indian
canon of construction regarding statutory ambiguity,177 the court proclaimed, “we
are unable to find a case on all fours with the controversy we are asked to resolve
today.”178 The Law Court’s preconceived agenda was on full display as it adopted
the state’s amicus brief arguments, which were rejected in Bottomly.179 The court
stated:
[E]ven in Worcester v. Georgia the Indians’ right of self-government existed only
“because it had been recognized and allowed to continue in the relevant treaty” . . . .
Under this view, the federal precedents are of little help to a court faced with a claim
of inherent sovereignty by a tribe that has had little or no historical relationship with
the federal government . . . . In fact, because of the dearth of federal contract [sic]
with Maine Indians and their long and intricate historical relationship with the State
of Maine, it was long doubted whether they constituted “bona fide tribes” under
federal Indian law.180

The court went on to engage in explicit fear-mongering, similar to opponents of
desegregation, in a discussion about the prospect of the Penobscot Nation destroying
communities under the claim of inherent sovereignty by “selling drugs” and making
“a myriad of other forbidden and even criminal practices legal so long as they turned
a profit for the Nation.”181
The court announced its justification for ignoring federal Indian common law
by declaring:
[T]he federal [MICSA] and state [MIA] . . . have independently defined the sphere
within which the tribe can operate free of state regulation, and that [bingo] cannot
be considered an “internal tribal matter” within that narrow sphere.182

The court’s finding of an “independently defined sphere” to create an analytical
framework that excludes federal Indian common law was essential for its “internal
tribal matters” analysis. Ironically, MIA’s employment of the phrase “internal tribal
matter” is open-ended, as the phrase is not defined and is only explained through
reliance on a broad non-exclusive list of topics such as membership, residency on

175. Id.
176. Id. at 482-84.
177. See supra note 143 (discussing the First Circuit’s application of the Indian canon of construction
in Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton); see infra note 195 (discussing rules of
construction applicable to Indian law questions).
178. Penobscot Nation, 461 A.2d at 484.
179. See supra notes 147-52 (discussing the First Circuit’s rejection of the same argument advanced
by the state in Stilphen).
180. Penobscot Nation, 461 A.2d at 484, 487.
181. Id. at 486, 489.
182. Id. at 482.
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the reservation, use of settlement funds, tribal organization, and government.183
Within this ambiguous definition, the court stated that the phrase “internal tribal
matters” has no relevance to the phrases “internal and social relations,” “internal
affairs,” or “tribal self-government,” as such phrases are used in the federal Indian
common law because “[o]ne would be rash to equate this phrase with such terms . . .
merely because of a partial language overlap.”184 Unsurprisingly, the federal cases
the Law Court cited that used those terms ruled in favor of exclusive tribal
jurisdiction.185
Finally, the court applied the ejusdem generis rule to hold that the Nation’s
bingo hall is dissimilar from the subject matters listed in the MIA definition.186
However, it does not strain the principles of logic to find that the MIA definition
applies to the on-reservation domestic affairs of the tribe, which would include onreservation economic development, like the Penobscot’s bingo hall. Ultimately,
Stilphen represents judicial activism at its worst, a court choosing an outcome—
exclusive state jurisdiction—and then casting about for the plausible theory to
support the outcome. Fortunately, the First Circuit would later have the opportunity
to repudiate Stilphen’s approach to the construction of the Settlement Acts.
In Akins v. Penobscot Nation, the First Circuit considered the definition of
“internal tribal matters” and determined that the tribal court of the Penobscot Nation
held exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a tribal timber harvesting
policy.187 The court concluded that the permitting policy was an “internal tribal
matter” primarily because the matter involved a dispute between tribal members and
the economic use of on-reservation natural resources.188 In addition, the court
announced a list of considerations that weighed in favor of the dispute qualifying as
an internal tribal matter, which included: (i) the policy regulated only tribal members
and not non-members, (ii) the policy regulated the commercial use of lands acquired
with MICSA funds, (iii) the permit fees were paid to the Penobscot Nation, (iv) no
interests of the State of Maine were implicated, and (v) the issuance of stumpage
permits had been consistently viewed under the law as an internal tribal matter.189
The First Circuit’s analysis rejected the Law Court’s exclusion of federal Indian
common law to determine internal tribal matters under the MIA by stating: “we also
do not agree that reference to such [federal Indian] law is never helpful in defining

183. 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (2021).
184. Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 489.
185. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382, 384-85 (1886) (using the phrase “internal and
social relations”); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 22123 (1959) (acknowledging that the “internal affairs
of the Indians” should remain “exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government” exists
when declaring that the state did not have jurisdiction over a crime committed); McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm’n of Az., 411 U.S. 164, 179, 181 (1973) (determining that a state’s imposition of income taxes
upon reservation members violated principles of tribal self-government).
186. Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 489 (“By the familiar ejusdem generis rule, a general term followed by a
list of illustrations is ordinarily assumed to embrace only concepts similar to those illustrations.”).
187. Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 483, 490 (1st Cir. 1997).
188. Id. at 489-90.
189. Id. at 486-87.
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what is an internal tribal matter.”190 It importantly then highlighted that “[g]eneral
federal Indian case law support[ed its] conclusion.”191
The First Circuit ruled in favor of the Penobscot Nation again in Penobscot
Nation v. Fellencer,192 a case of claimed racial discrimination by a former employee
of the Nation’s government.193 The court held the termination of a non-Indian,
former employee of the tribal government could not be challenged in state court
pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act.194 Following the precedent in Akins, the
First Circuit adopted several federal Indian canons of construction, stating:
[S]pecial rules of statutory construction obligate us to construe “acts diminishing
the sovereign rights of Indian tribes . . . strictly,” “with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to the [Indians’] benefit.”. These special canons of construction are
employed “in order to comport with the[ ] traditional notions of sovereignty and
with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence,” and are “rooted in the
unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.”195

Recently, in 2021, the Law Court resolved an internal tribal matters question
and relied on basic doctrines of federal Indian common law to rule in favor of tribal
interests. In Moyant v. Petit, the Law Court reviewed an internal tribal matter
question involving a non-Indian plaintiff who sought damages against the
Passamaquoddy Tribe for improvements made under a campsite lease between the
Tribe and a tribal member on tribal land.196 The court determined that the matter did
not fit “squarely” within MIA’s definition of internal tribal matters and proceeded to
apply the Akins factors.197 One might have expected the Law Court to find that the
dispute did not qualify as an internal tribal matter because the plaintiff was nonIndian. However, the court ruled in favor of tribal jurisdiction, holding that almost
all of the Akins factors “support the determination that this dispute is an ‘internal
tribal matter.’”198 Notably, the court found the plaintiff’s non-Indian status was not
determinative of whether the issue was an internal tribal matter.199 The court
referenced the seminal federal Indian law cases Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez200
and Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante,201 stating:
Tribal jurisdiction does not disappear simply because a person who is not a member
of the Tribe is involved in a dispute, especially when the action is against the Tribe
and a tribal member concerning tribal land. It is difficult to conceive of a more
appropriate forum for this case than the tribal court.202

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 489.
Id.
Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706 (1st Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709 (internal citations omitted).
Moyant v. Petit, 2021 ME 13, 247 A.3d 326.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
Moyant, 2021 ME 13, ¶ 14, 247 A.3d 326.
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The Law Court clearly grounded its holding in Moyant in federal Indian
common law doctrines.
The First Circuit, and recently the Law Court, apply federal Indian common law
principles to resolve disputes under the Settlement Acts. The principles applied by
these courts flow from a broader body of federal common law, which affirm and
support the proposition that the establishment of a reservation by treaty, statute, or
agreement may also include implied rights to hunt, fish, and gather both on and offreservation. The existence of these common law rights comes from federal cases
addressing the extinguishment of aboriginal title.
B. Application of Indian Law Principles to Reserved Rights
Aboriginal title or Indian title is a right of a Tribal nation to possess and occupy
lands and may only be alienated by the tribe to the federal government through
purchase or conquest.203 In Mitchel v. United States, the Supreme Court confirmed
the equal footing on which Tribal nations held their lands by favorably comparing
aboriginal title to the “fee simple of the whites.” 204 Extinguishment of aboriginal
title also terminates hunting, fishing, and gathering rights grounded in that title,
“except where such rights are expressly or impliedly reserved in a treaty, statute or
executive order.”205 There are likely no parcels of land upon which aboriginal title
has not been extinguished. Nonetheless, tribes and individual Indians continue to
bring claims that a specific aspect of aboriginal title, such as the right to engage in
hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering, remains extant.206 Thus, aboriginal use
rights, like subsurface mineral rights or utility easements, are severable and may not
terminate with extinguishment of aboriginal title, unless such extinguishment is
express.207
Aboriginal rights may be established independent of title to such lands if the
claim shows use of such rights is continuous and exclusive for a long period of time
and is adverse to other users and claimants.208 A claim of aboriginal rights is not
defeated by “[t]he fact that such right of occupancy finds no recognition in any
statute or other formal governmental action.”209 Therefore, tribes retain their
aboriginal rights unless otherwise relinquished by treaty, abandoned, or extinguished
by statute.210
The exercise of aboriginal rights by Tribal nations and their citizens predates the
existence of the United States and derives from historic tribal use, occupation, and

203. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
204. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711 (1835).
205. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Rsrv. v. Washington, 96 F.3d 334, 341 (9th Cir. 1996).
206. MATTHEW L. M. FLETCHER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 94 (2017).
207. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999).
208. See, e.g., Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1163 (10th Cir. 2015); Native Village
of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 626 (9th Cir. 2012).
209. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
210. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 18.01 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2017). The Settlement Acts authorize tribal members to exercise on-reservation sustenance fishing
subject to the oversight of the state of Maine Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, but there is
no express extinguishment of aboriginal use rights. 30 M.R.S. § 6207(4) (2021).
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possession of territory by tribal entities.211 The right includes both traditional and
so-called modern means of harvesting the resources subject to the right.212 The
extermination of tribes and rapid seizure of tribal lands extinguished aboriginal title
across most of the United States, but many tribes that survived the American
genocide expressly reserved and protected their rights through a federal action,
typically a treaty, statute, or Executive Order.213 “Depending on the legal system
and the type of use, these rights have been called ‘common law aboriginal rights,’
‘usufructuary rights,’ ‘off-reservation rights,’ ‘reserved rights,’ ‘unextinguished
rights,’ ‘inherent rights,’ ‘non-territorial aboriginal title’ and ‘customary rights.’”214
If such “reserved rights” are recognized by Congress, they then become vested
property interests subject to the Takings and Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution.215 These rights generally provide for a tribal
member’s ability to engage in certain activities beyond the exterior boundaries of a
treaty reservation and in areas that the tribe previously occupied or used.216 The
reserved rights doctrine also mandates interpretation of Indian treaty provisions as
reserving to the Indians any rights not expressly granted or conveyed by them.217
The reserved rights doctrine corresponds directly to international law, which holds
that the sovereign rights of treaty-making nations are fully preserved except to the
extent that they are expressly waived or conditioned.218 Under the reserved rights
doctrine, exclusive on-reservation hunting, fishing, and gathering rights are
“implied” from the establishment of a reservation, whereas on ceded lands, tribal
nations may also retain hunting and fishing rights.219
Decisions of the Supreme Court strike a balance between the ability of tribal
members to exercise off-reservation reserved rights and the need for a state to enforce
conservation measures. A state may enforce certain kinds of conservation and public

211. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823) (the legal relationship between the United
States and tribes is premised on the idea that tribes are “the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and use it according to their own discretion”); Mitchel v.
United States, 34 U.S. 711, 713 (1835) (“One uniform rule seems to have prevailed in the British provinces
in America by which Indian lands were held and sold, from their first settlement, as appears by their
laws—that friendly Indians were protected in the possession of the lands they occupied, and were
considered as ow[n]ing them by a perpetual right of possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting them, as
their common property, from generation to generation, not as the right of the individuals located on
particular spots.”).
212. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420,
1430 (W.D. Wis. 1983); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 402 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
213. COHEN, supra note 210, at § 18.01.
214. Guy Charlton, The Law of Native American Hunting, Fishing and Gathering Rights Outside of
Reservation Boundaries in the United States and Canada, 39 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 68, 71 (2015).
215. See FLETCHER, supra note 206, at 102.
216. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 175-76, 184 (1999); United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905); FLETCHER, supra note 206, at 97.
217. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 (“[T]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right
from them – a reservation of those not granted.”).
218. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (Chief Justice Marshall noted the international
law basis of tribal sovereignty).
219. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 196-97.
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safety measures on tribal members exercising off-reservation treaty rights,220 but
there are limits on the extent to which a state can impede access to treaty-guaranteed
resources that are located off-reservation. For example, the Supreme Court recently
affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision which held that a state had infringed upon a treaty
right to take fish at off-reservation fishing places through its refusal to remove
obstacles to fish passage that made it impracticable or impossible for a tribal member
to take fish in a meaningful quantity.221 Where fishing places are specified by treaty,
a state may not prevent access to those places for fishing either through physical
obstructions or license fees.222 This means that “[n]either states nor private property
owners may bar tribal access to areas subject to treaty hunting, fishing, and gathering
rights.”223 Still, a state may regulate reserved treaty rights where a state can
“demonstrate that its regulation is a reasonable and necessary conservation
measure . . . and that its application to the Indians is necessary in the interests of
conservation.”224 Nonetheless, in the absence of off-reservation treaty rights, a tribal
member outside of Indian country will be subject to state law just like anyone else.225
C. Rules of Construction Applicable to Federal Indian Law
First, treaties are federal laws that preempt conflicting state laws, and only
Congress has authority to abrogate treaties or extinguish treaty rights by a clear and
unambiguous statement.226 The Supreme Court has explained that “[a]s a general
rule, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to
them . . . [and] [t]hese rights need not be expressly mentioned in the treaty.”227 When
interpreting language within a treaty, the Supreme Court follows the original
meaning and may not “favor contemporaneous or later practices instead of the laws
Congress passed.”228 If an ambiguous statutory term or phrase emerges, the Court
may look beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the treaty,
including the history, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties to determine the original meaning.229 Courts must interpret treaties liberally,
resolving uncertainties in favor of the Indians, and must “give effect to the terms as

220. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975) (holding that a reserved treaty right could
not be taken away or abridged by a state but that a state regulation affecting reserved rights may be
enforced against tribal members where the regulation is a reasonable and necessary conservation
measure).
221. See United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 966 (9th Cir. 2017).
222. WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 554 (7th ed. 2019) (citing
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) and Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942)).
223. COHEN, supra note 210, at § 18.04(f) (citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-82
(1905)).
224. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975); see also Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game
(Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
225. CANBY, supra note 222, at 555.
226. Washington State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1014 (2019); Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566-68 (1903).
227. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
228. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2468 (2020); see also Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1016
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
229. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740-45; Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196
(1999); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).
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the Indians themselves would have understood them.”230 The rules are not only
applicable to the interpretation of treaty rights, but also federal statutes ratifying
agreements with tribes, such as the MICSA.231
In Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., Justice
Gorsuch’s concurrence provided a rationale for the Court’s rules of construction
regarding the Yakama Treaty of 1855:
After all, the United States drew up this contract, and we normally construe any
ambiguities against the drafter who enjoys the power of the pen. Nor is there any
question that the government employed that power to its advantage in this case.
During the negotiations “English words were translated into Chinook jargon . . .
although that was not the primary language” of the Tribe. After the parties reached
agreement, the U.S. negotiators wrote the treaty in English—a language that the
Yakamas couldn’t read or write. And like many such treaties, this one was by all
accounts more nearly imposed on the Tribe than a product of its free choice.232

The Settlement Acts are rife with ambiguities, and Justice Gorsuch demonstrates
why any court interpreting the MICSA or MIA must apply the Indian canon of
construction—a critical principle of federal Indian common law that is used to
interpret the intent and understanding of ambiguities as understood by a tribal party.
D. Ambiguities Regarding Treatment of Aboriginal Rights Under the Settlement
Acts Must be Resolved Using Principles of Federal Indian Common Law
We finally reach the fundamental question of whether aboriginal rights either
reserved or never relinquished by the Wabanaki Nations still exist. Nowhere in the
Settlement Acts or in case law interpreting Wabanaki rights does one see
consideration of how the native signatories understood the original meaning of their
treaties or how they understood the treatment of those treaties within the MICSA.
Section 4(a)(1) of the MICSA ratified and approved transfers made by the tribes
within the treaties as though such transfers were initially made in accordance with
federal law. However, this section ratifies these transfers without specific reference
to the rights reserved to the tribes therein or other rights that the tribes never ceded.
This is a curious omission given the monumental significance of such rights to the
Passamaquoddy Tribe in particular.
As if to explain this very silence, the committee reports explicitly state that “the
Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation will retain as reservations those
lands and natural resources233 which were reserved to them in their treaties with

230. Cougar Den, Inc. 139 S. Ct. at 1016 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 196); see also McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468.
231. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) (“The canon of construction applied over a
century and a half by this Court is that the wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the
Indians is not to be construed to their prejudice.”).
232. Washington State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 (2019).
233. Section 3(b) of MICSA defines “land or natural resources” as including any “real property or
natural resources, or any interest in or right involving any real property or natural resources, including but
without limitation minerals and mineral rights, timber and timber rights, water and water rights, and
hunting and fishing rights.” Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-420, § 3(b), 94 Stat.
1785, 1794 (1980).
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Massachusetts and not subsequently transferred by them.”234 According to the First
Circuit, such statements in final committee reports “are [an] authoritative source for
determining legislative intent.”235 When one applies the Indian law doctrine that
Tribal nations retain aboriginal rights unless otherwise relinquished by treaty,
abandoned, or extinguished by statute, Congress’s decision to address this issue in
the committee report rather than MICSA makes sense.236 This rule illustrates that
Congress did not need to explicitly deal with such rights because they existed as a
function of Indian law to the extent recognized by Congress. Importantly, in this
case, Congress was explicitly aware of the treaties entered into between
Passamaquoddy and Penobscot going back as far as 1820, when the United States
Senate was read the treaty provision of the Maine Constitution during deliberations
over the Act of Separation between Massachusetts and Maine.237 Thus, Congress’s
consideration and approval of the Act of Separation constituted congressional
recognition of the aboriginal and reserved rights contemplated in the Maine
Constitution.
During negotiations, Passamaquoddy negotiators understood that their rights
were not subject to relinquishment or extinguishment unless done so expressly.
Wayne Newell, a member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe’s negotiating team for the
Settlement Acts, stated with respect to this concept that, “I also start with the premise
that unless we give up a right, specifically give it up, it’s still ours; we retain it by
just historical purposes, our aboriginal inheritance.”238 Additionally, one of the lead
negotiators for the State, Maine Attorney General Richard Cohen, stated in 1997:
“[i]t is my recollection that salt water rights and issues were not discussed during the
Settlement negotiations.”239 In other words, Congress did not need to mention rights
reserved by the tribes or not otherwise transferred, because those rights were
acknowledged by Congress and were never understood to be transferred.
More direct statutory support for the notion that rights tied to the treaties were
expressly contemplated in the Settlement Acts comes from the MIA. Section 6204
of the MIA provides in pertinent part: “all Indians, Indian nations, and tribes and
bands of Indians in the State and any lands or other natural resources owned by
them . . . shall be subject to the laws of the State.”240 The MIA defines “Laws of the
State” as including “the Constitution” among other sources of law.241 Since 1980,
Maine officials have pointed to section 6204 as though Wabanaki life is under the
thumb of the state and as though the laws of Maine affirmatively reject the existence

234. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 3794 (1980); S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 18 (1980). But see Maine Indian
Claims Settlement Act, § 12, 94 Stat. at 1794 (providing a general discharge of the State of Maine’s
obligations “arising from any treaty or agreement with, or on behalf of any Indian nation”).
235. Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 489 (1st Cir. 1997).
236. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
237. Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1975)
(“The Maine Constitution, with the above quoted provision relating to the Indians, was read in the [U.S.]
Senate, referred to committee, and finally declared by Congress to be established.”).
238. DONALD SOCTOMAH, PASSAMAQUODDY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: 1890-1920 15 (2002).
239. ME. INDIAN TRIBAL STATE COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SALTWATER
FISHERIES CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PASSAMAQUODDY AND THE STATE OF ME. 143 (2014).
240. 30 M.R.S. § 6204 (2021).
241. Id. § 6203(4).
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of treaty rights. To be fair, lawyers, judges, and elected officials in the state have
relied on this concept in legal opinions, court briefings, and public statements since
the Law Court began erroneously ruling against tribal treaty rights in the 1870s. So,
they are just repeating what Maine has falsely held as true for over a century.
However, this logic is fundamentally flawed.
The Maine State Constitution, which reigns supreme over all laws, regulations,
and court decisions that form the body of Maine law, expressly recognizes the
“validity” of such treaties even though the state decided to stick its proverbial head
in the sand when the treaty provision was omitted from printing.242 One could push
back on the validity of the treaties by referencing MICSA’s statement that the statute
“constitute[s] a general discharge and release of all obligations of the State of
Maine . . . arising from any treaty . . . with, or on behalf of any Indian nation.”243
However, such an argument would not alter the text of the Maine State Constitution,
which explicitly provides that omission of the treaty provision from the official
printed version of the constitution “shall not impair the validity of acts under [that
section of the constitution].”244 Thus, any stipulations in the Settlement Acts that the
“lands and natural resources” of the tribes are subject to the “Laws of the State” must
refer to the treaties embedded in Maine’s organic law.
Turning to how one must interpret reserved and never ceded aboriginal rights,
the Passamaquoddy identify themselves in their own language as the “people who
spear pollock,” a fish that only lives in the saltwater.245 So, the identity of the
Passamaquoddy people revolves around the act of harvesting marine resources for
food. In its 1794 Treaty, the Passamaquoddy Tribe specifically reserved lands and
rights deemed necessary for survival of the people.246 This included the reservation
of what is now Indian Township, which sits immediately adjacent to the St. Croix
River.247 The Treaty also “assigned” to the Passamaquoddy the right to fish in both
branches of the St. Croix River “without hindrance or molestation and the privilege
of passing the said river over the different carrying places thereon.”248 In addition,
the Tribe was “assigned” a tract of land called “Pleasant Point” or Sipayik, which
means, “place on the edge of the water” in the Passamaquoddy-Maliseet language.
Pleasant Point sits next to what is now called Passamaquoddy Bay, which is still
home to numerous traditional foods for the Passamaquoddy, including eels, whales,
cod, lobster, pollock, and numerous other marine resources. The Treaty also
recognized the Passamaquoddy Tribe’s “privilege of setting down at the carrying

242. Me. Const. art. X, § 7.
243. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785, 1796-97 (1980).
244. Me. Const. art. X, § 7.
245. See Peskotom, PASSAMAQUODDY-MALISEET LANGUAGE PORTAL, https://pmportal.org/
dictionary/peskotom [https://perma.cc/7DCN-ZVY5] (last visited May 13, 2022) (defining “peskotom” as
“pollock” in the English language); Peskotomuhkati, PASSAMAQUODDY-MALISEET LANGUAGE PORTAL,
https://pmportal.org/dictionary/peskotomuhkati [https://perma.cc/XTF4-U9Z4] (last visited May 13.
2022) (defining “Peskotomuhkati” as “Passamaquoddy” in the English language).
246. See Treaty between the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Sept.
29, 1794, supra note 6.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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place at West Quoddy between the Bay of West Quoddy and the [B]ay of Fundy, to
contain fifty acres.”249
Each of these aforementioned references either explicitly or impliedly reserved
the right to fish in fresh or saltwater. Lands located along waterways and saltwater
were not reserved so tribal members would have to paddle their birch bark canoes
into the high seas in some of the most dangerous tides in the western hemisphere,
which happened to be in their backyard.250 Rather, the Tribe reserved these lands
because they boasted access to sustenance in the form of fish and game use for
familial consumption and trade to acquire other necessities in life. To conclude
otherwise would entirely subvert the Passamaquoddy Tribe’s intent and
understanding when it entered the 1794 Treaty.
Correspondence and notes from before execution of the 1794 Treaty
demonstrate the immense significance of Pleasant Point and access to saltwater, in
particular, for the Passamaquoddy People. In fact, a 1793 report delivered to
Massachusetts legislators reflected that the Passamaquoddy rejected any deal that
did not include land at Pleasant Point.251 The Passamaquoddy considered possession
of “a place of residence on the Sea Shore” to be fulfillment of promises made during
the Revolutionary War.252 Thus, a people whose name derives from the harvest of
marine resources specifically sought to preserve their access to such resources by
entering into the 1794 Treaty, which was acknowledged in Congress and engrained
in the Maine State Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Under Federal Indian law, ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the tribe,
and extinguishment of treaty rights requires a clear and unambiguous statement by
Congress. The MICSA and MIA are ambiguous, and neither terminated Wabanaki
treaties. Even if Maine successfully oppressed and terrorized the Wabanaki for over
a century, Justice Gorsuch reminds us that “[u]nlawful acts, performed long enough
and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law. To hold otherwise
would be to elevate the most brazen and longstanding injustices over the law, both
rewarding wrong and failing those in the right.”253 The State of Maine has made the
exact opposite argument since the 19th Century as part of the State’s longstanding
attempts to subvert and oppress the Wabanaki people. Such arguments ring
especially hollow when one considers that the rights proclaimed by the Wabanaki
were forged with blood that was spilled on the battlefield of the American Revolution
at the request of General George Washington.
249. Id.
250. See Old Sow Whirlpool, BAY OF FUNDY, https://www.bayoffundy.com/about/old-sow-whirlpool/
[https://perma.cc/L9G2-4GUP] (last visited Mar. 20, 2022) (explaining that the Bay of Fundy is the home
of the second largest whirlpool in the world, named Old Sow, which is known to form large funnels).
251. MA. COMM’RS REP. OF THE PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBE, Resolve 1793, ch. 129, at 4 (Feb. 28, 1794)
(original papers in the Massachusetts State Archives summarizing Passamaquoddy Chief Francis Joseph
Neptune’s assertion that “no other lands would be acceptable to them but a hundred acres of land at a
place called pleasant point”).
252. MALISEET, PASSAMAQUODDY, AND MI’KMAQ PETITION TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF MA.,
Resolve 1792, ch. 185, at 2 (Mar. 27, 1793).
253. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2482 (2020).
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